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562 SHRIMPTON V. SUPERIOR COURT [22 C.2d 
[L. A. No. 186,14. In Bank. July 27, 1943.] 
13. F. SHRIMP TON, as a Member of the Re~donal Planning 
. Commission, etc., et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent. 
[1] Certiorari-Remedy by Appeal-Orders After· Judgment.-
Certiorari will not lie to review an. order setting aside both a' 
prior order vacating the findings and judgment and a formal 
judgnient of dismissal, where tho order in question was appeal-
able not simply because it was an order after final judgment, 
but also because it was made pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., 
§473. 
PEOCEEDING to review an order of the Superior Court 
of Los Angeles County setting a.'!ide both a prior order vacat-
ing the findings and judgment and a formal judgment of dis-
missal. Proceeding dismissed. 
J. H. O?Connor, County Counsel, and Edward A. Gaylord 
and Beach Vasey, Deputy County Counsel, for Petitioners. 
Courtney A. Teel for Respondent. 
CURTIS, J .-In an action entitled Acker v. Baldwin, 18 
Oal.2d 341 [115 P.2d 455], pending- in the Superior Court 
of the County of Los Angeles, plaintiff on April 17, 1942, 
recovered judgment against the defendants. Petitioner was 
one of the defendants in said action. Defendants, within the 
permissible time, I'lerved a notice of intention to move for a 
new trial. ::;ubsequcntly said motion was made and the trial 
court at the hearing thereof on June 22, 1942, made an order 
vacating. the findings and judgment and dismissed the action 
on the ground' that it had no jurisdiction of the action. On 
July 7, 1942, there was entered a formal judgment of dis-
missal. Thereafter and on August 12, 1942, and after notice 
to defendants, plaintiff moved the court to set aside said order 
and judgment of dismissal on the ground that said order 
was void and in excess of the jurisdiction of said court. This 
[1] SCI' 4 Cal.Jur.1033; 10 Am.Jur. 53l. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Certiorari, § 32. 
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motion was made under section 473 of the Code of Civil Pr~­
cedure authorizing the court, on motion after notice to the 
other party to set aside any void judgment or order.. On 
August 19, 1942, the trial court granted said motion ,and set 
aside and vacated both the order vacating the fuidings and' 
judgment and the formal judgment of July 7, 1942, based 
upon said order. The effect of this order of August 19, 1942, 
if valid, wonld be to restore the original judgment rendered 
in that action in favor of the plaintiffs. , . 
Thereupon the petitioner, as one of the defendants hi said, 
action, instituted this proceeding in certiorari to review the 
last mentioned order of the trial court of date, August 19, 
1942. It is the contention of petitioner that the judgment of 
date, July 7, 1942, dismissing said action, was a valid and 
final judgment and that the trial court was without jurisdic-
tion to vacate the final judgment. 
[1] Preliminary to the discussion of the merits of this 
controversy, it is necessary to consider and pm;s upon the 
point. raised by respondents, that certiorari will not lie to 
review the order of August 19, 1942, for the reason that it is 
an order made after final judgment and therefore is ap-
pealable. 
Section 1068, Code of Civil Procedure, provides that '.' A 
writ of review may be granted by any court, except a muni-
cipal, police or justice's court, when an inferior tribunal; 
board, or officer, exercising judicial functions, has exceeded 
the jurisdiction of such tribunal, board, or officer, and there 
is no appeal, nor, in the jUdgment of the court, any plain; 
speedy, and adequate remedy." 
We deem it unnecessary to do any more than cite a few of 
the decisions of this court holding "certiorari will not lie to 
review an appealable order or judgment either before or after 
the expiration of the time limited by law for appeal tliere~ 
from." (Ivory v. Superior Oourt, 12 Ca1.2d 455,4G9 [85 P.2Q 
894] ; Harth v. Ten Eyck, 12 Ca1.2d 709 [87 P.2d G93/], 1~ 
Cal.2d 829 [108 P.2d 675] ; Ooam v. Supr.rior Oourt, 14 Ca1.2d' 
591 [95 P.2d 931]; Howaldt v. Supl.wior 001trt, 18 Ca1.2d 
114 [114 P.2d 333] ; Bank of America v. Superior Oourt, 20 
Ca1.2d 697, 703 [128 P.2d 357] ; Lewith v. Rchmke, 215 Cal; 
241 [9 P.2d 297] ; Oasner v. Superior Oourt, ~3 Ca1.A.pp.2d 
730 [74 P.2d 298].) In the last named case at page 732, we 
~ -
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find the following statement of the law: "The order of the 
court vacating the judgment of dismissal was a special order 
made after final judgment, as were also the rcnpective orders 
for judgment in defendants' favor, and, as such, were appeal-
able under the provisions of section 963 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. [citing authorities] ... Where the 11:. wallows an 
appeal from an order or judgment, even when the tribunal 
making such order or rendering such judgment exceeds its 
authority in so doing, a writ of review may not be granted. 
[citing authorities.] " 
.As against these decisions, we are cited to the following 
cases decided by this court, which, it is claimed, support a 
contrary rule: Stanton v. Superior Oourt, 202 Cal. 478, 488 
[261 P. 1001] ; Lankton v. Superior Oourt, 5 Cal.2d 694, 696 
[55 P.2d 1170] ; 'l'reat v. Superior Oourt, 7 Cal.2d 636, 638 
[62 P.2d 147] ; Whitley v. Superior Oourt, 18 Ca1.2d 75 [113 
P .2d 449]. In our opinion these cases can all be distin-
guished from the decisions holding that certiorari will not 
lie to review an appealable order. 
In Stanton v. Superior Court, supra, the trial court in two 
actions pending before it made an order in each case purport-
ing to vacate the judgment previously entered therein, and 
directed a different judgment, and signed and entered the 
same in lieu of the former judgment. On appeal the court 
recited the steps taken in the two actions before the trial court 
resulting in the orders vacating the original judgments and 
the entry of the different judgments in the place of the for-
mer judgments. The court also discussed the power of the 
trial court, and the procedure to be followed under sections 
473, 663, and 663a of the Code of Civil Procedure, governing 
the vacation of judgments and the entry of different judg-
ments in the same actions, and concluded as follows: (page 
- 489) "We are, therefore, satisfied that said sections of the 
code were never intended to apply to orders or judgments 
attempted after the fashion herein disclosed. We are also 
satisfied that neither of these orders or subsequent judgments 
can be said to be special orders made after final judgment 
within the meaning of section 963 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, because such scction contemplates orders given by a 
court having jurisdiction to act." The court, therefore, in 
the Stanton case held that as the orders in question were not 
special orders made after final judgment, they were not ap-
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pealable and were therefore subject to review under pro-
ceedings in certiorari. Reference to this case may be found 
in Ivory v. S11perior Oourt, supra, and Bank of America v. 
Superior Oourt, supra. 
In Lankton v. Superior Oourt, supra, after the judgment' 
in favor of the plaintiff had become final and the timc for 
appeal and motion for new trial had elapsed, the trial conrt 
in a memorandum opinion indicated its purpose to reduce the 
amount of the judgment in favor of plaintiff in a material 
amount. Plaintiff applied either for a writ of prohibition or 
a writ of review. It was held that he WAS entitled to a writ 
of prohibition but not a writ of review, as no order modifying 
the judgment had been actually made by the trial court. 
In 'l'reat v. Superior Oourt, supra, the trial court set aside 
its findings and judgment in favor of plaintiff. It was held 
that the court was authorized to make such an order either 
under the provisions of section 662 of the Codc of Civil Fro-
cedure, that is, upon a motion for a new trial, or by reason 
of its inherent power to correct mistakes in its proceedings, 
and to annul within a reasonable time orders and judgments 
prematurely, inadv~rtently, or improvidently made. How-
ever, it appeared from the record of the proceeding before 
the court that the order of the trial court under attack was 
not mad~ under the authority of either of these methods of 
proc'edure: While a notice of intention to move for a: new 
trial was filed at the same time as the motion to vacate the 
findings and judgment, it is stated in the opinion: (page 
641) "There is nothing before us to indicate that any action 
upon the motion for a new trial was ever taken by the trial 
court," and also (page 640) "Respondent advances no claim 
or contention that the original findings and judgment wcre 
prematurely or improvidently made." The court in that Mse 
upon the authority of the Stanton case, held that .the o:aer 
was not one rendered in pursuance of any of the p1,'escrlbcd 
rules of procedure as defined by the sections of the Code of 
Civil Procedure and was therefore subject to attack in a. 
proceeding for a writ of review. _ 
In Whitley v. Superior Oourt, supra, it was sought to review 
two nunc pro tunc orders of the trial court granting a motion 
for a new trial. .As amended 'in 1939, section 657 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure provides that when a new tri~ ,--~ 
,~ '. . ~ ,.-} 
.. 
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granted on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence, the 
order of the trial court shall so specify in writing and shall 
be filed with the clerk within ten days after the motion is 
granted, otherwise on appeal it will be conclusively presumed 
that the order was not based upon that ground. In the case 
in which these orders were made, the trial court granted the 
motion of defendant for a new trial, but failed to file any 
written order other than a minute order. After the ten day 
period, the plaIntiff appealed. Almost two months later in 
one instance and a.lmost three months in the other, the trial 
court, apparently being of the opinion that the written min-
ute order was insufficient as entered, signed and filed the two 
nunc pro tunc orders; the first of which stated that the 
ground upon which the order granting a new trial was made 
was the insufficiency of the evidence, and in the second of said 
orders, it was recited that the failure to file the written 
(signed) formal order within the ten day limit was due to 
the inadvertence of the court and not of counsel as had been 
stated in the prior signed order. ,After holding that the c~urt 
was without jurisdiction to make either of said orders and 
. ' In reply to the contention that certiorari would not lie, the 
.court on page 82 stated: "Finally, as 8,n objection to a de-
termination of the validity of these nunc pro tunc orders, 
respondent, urges the point that a writ of review is not a 
proper proceeding in this case, as petitioner has her remedy 
py appeal. Respondent here calls attention to the general rule 
that certiorari may not be used as a substitute for appeal (4 
Cal.Jur. 1052). But it is likewise well recognized that an 
order which is not provided for in our procedure is not an 
appealable order within the meaning of section 1068, Code 
of Civil Procedure, and an application for a writ of review 
is the proper remedy. [citing among others the Stanton and 
,Treat ,cases.]" No claim was made in that case that either 
of the two nunc pro tunc orders was made under section 473 
of the Code of Civil Procedure, and therefore that point was 
not passed upon by the court in its decision. 
In each of the four cases just discussed, there appeared 
some special reason why the g'eneral rule that certiorari will 
not lie to review an appealable order was not applicable. 
These cases can readily be distinguished from the instant pro-
ceeding. It will be noted that the underlying principle upon 
which the Stanton case was decide-d, and which was followed 
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generally in the other cases, was that the order of the trial 
court under attack was not in pursuance of any of the pre-
scribed methods of procedure as defined by the Code of Civil 
Procedure. As noted herein the order of August 19, 1942, 
setting aside the order and judgment of dismissal was ren~ 
dered 'in pursuance of section 473 of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure. It was, therefore, an order made after judgment and 
was appealable. 
Weare therefore of the opinion in view of the overwhelm-
ing weight of authority in this state, that the petition herein 
to review the order of the trial court of date, Augus.t 19, 1942; 
purporting to vacate its order dated July 7, 1942,should be' 
denied. This conclusion renders it unnecessary toeriter into' 
any discussion of the question of the validity,' of said 'order, 
of August 19, 1942, or of any other question' raised by the 
petition. 
The petition is denied· for the reason hereinbefore stated.. 
Shenk, J., Carter, J., and Schauer, 'J., concurred. 
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment. It is ,settled 
that certiorari does not lie to review an appealable order: 
(Cal. Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1068; see cases cited in 4 Cal.Jur: 
1036. et, seq.) Section 963 of the Code of Civil-- Procedure: 
lists among appealable orders, "any special order made after 
final judginent." Since the order of August 19, 1942, was l 
a special order made after final judgment it was appealable' 
and certiorari is therefore not available. The majority opin-
ion takes the view, however, that the order in question was' 
appealable not simply because it was a specil;\l order after 
final judgment but also because it waS made pursuant to an: 
established method of procedure, in this case, section 473, of 
the Code of Civil Procedure. It is my opinion that any s~ecial : 
order after final judgment that affects the judgm:ent (see' 2 
Cal.Jur. 153) is appealable whether or not it is made pur-
suant toa prescribed rule of procedure. The exception of' 
orders that are not authorized by the Code of Civil Procedure' 
was first, read into section 963 in 1927 in the case of Stanton 
v. Superior Oourt, 202 Cal. 478 [261 P. 1001], in disregard of 
numerous cases of longstanding. (Livermore v. Oampbell, 52 
Cal. 75 ;In re Bullock, 75 Cal. 419 [17 P. 540] ; White v.Su-
perior Oourt, 110 Cal. 54 [42 P. 471] ; Anglo-Oalifornia Bank 
r ,. ( '. 
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v. Superio'r Court, 153 Cal. 753 [96 P. 803] ; Hildebrand v. 
S1tperior Court, 173 Cal. 86 [159 P. 147]; Magee v. Superior 
Court,10 Cal.App. 154 [101 P. 532] ; for additional cases see 
2 Cal.Jur. 184 and 4 Cal.Jur. 1036 et seq.) 
The holding in the Stanton case that section 963 "contem-
plates orders given by a court having jurisdiction to act" 
(202 Cal. 478, 489) would apply as well to final judgments, 
for both final judgments and orders, after such judgments 
are made appealable in the same terms. No conaition that 
the court must have jurisdiction to act is set forth with respect 
to either, and there is no more justification for adding such a 
condition in the one case than in the other. The Stanton case 
and those based upon it have departed from established 
principles without adequate consideration of the authorities. 
These cases should be overruled and the law restored to its 
traditional pattern as described in White v.' Superior Court, 
110 Cal. 54 [42 P. 471], at 57: "T~e order in question is a 
special order, made after final judgment, and, as such, is 
made the subject of appeal by express terms of the statute 
(Code Civ. Proc., sec. 939, subd. 3; sec. 963, subd. 2; Sla-
vonic etc. Assn. V. Superior Court, 65 Cal. 500 [4 P. 500] ; 
Livermore V. Campbell, 52 Cal. 75; Calderwood V. Peyser, 42 
Cal. 110); and, being so appealable, it cannot be reviewed 
by certiorari. 
" Nor does it make any difference in this respect if the 
order be, as contended, in excess of the jurisdiction of the 
court making it, .and consequently void. Void judgments and 
orders are not the less appealable by reason of that fact 
(Livermore V. Campbell, supra; and when that remedy is 
afforded it excludes the right to certiorari, notwithstanding 
the order be void in the extreme sense. (People V. Shepard, 
28 Cal. 115; Stoddard V. Superior Court, 108 Cal. 303 [41 P. 
278].) 'It may be readily admitted,' says Mr. Justice McFar-
land in delivering the opinion of the court in the case last 
cited, 'that the court had no jurisdiction to make the order; 
but, ,as the order is appealable, certiorari will not lie, because 
it lies only when "there is no appeaL" , 
"So far, then, as th~ remedy by certiorari is concerned, it 
would be wholly unprofitable to consider the question as to 
jurisdiction of the respondent to make the order complained 
of." ' 
Gibson, C. J., and Edmonds, J., concurred. 
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, V. JAMES LANIGAN et al., 
Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel-Right to 
Undivided Assistance.-It was prejudicial error to deny a de-
fendant in a criminal case the undivided assistance of his 
counsel and to force an unwilling codefendant to be repre-
.sented by such counsel, where counsel himself neither wished 
to nor could with propriety represent more than one defen-
dant, where the defendant on whom the attorney was forced 
was given no opportunity to confer with him or other counsel, 
and where there might have been a conflict in the interests of 
the two defendants as to such a question as whether counsel 
should advise each of them to testify in his own behalf. 
[2] Jury-Alternate Jurors.-An alternate juror was properly sub-
stituted by the trial court after the final submission of a crim-
inal case, where the regular juror became ill from an intestinal 
disturbance and continued to be in distress for several hours, 
where she was examined. by a physician who reported that he 
could give no definite assurance as to when she would recover, 
and where with the consent of both parties the judge also 
questioned the juror privately and was told by her that her 
illness was due in some degree to the nervous strain of the 
deliberations. The fact that the juror was back at her em-
ployment within a few days after her discharge was imma-
terial, as the court's action must be tested in the light of the 
evidence before it at the time of the decision. 
[3] Criminal Law-Continuances-Grounds-Congested Calendar 
-Depositions.-It was not an abuse of discretion to continue 
a criminal case some six weeks beyond the date which had 
been previously set for trial, where the court's calendar was 
congested during the intervening period, where all parties had 
favored a later date when they appeared in court, and where 
each defendant subsequently sought and obtained an order to 
take depositions out of the state. 
[1] See 7 Ca1.Jur. 939; 14 Am.Jur. 882. . 
[2] Statutes providing for substitution of jurors, notes, 70 
A.L.R. 188; 96 A.L.R. 793; 109 A.L.R. 1495. See, also, 15 Ca1.Jur. 
331; 31 Am.Jur 629 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 107; [2] Jury, § 4; 
[3] Criminal Law; §§ 252, 252(3). 
